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The author Nassim Taleb published an inﬂuential book
007 called the ‘‘The Black Swan’’ with the subtitle ‘‘The
act of highly improbable events’’. According to his
nition, a ‘‘black swan event’’ is a statistically improba-
 event that occurs with no prior warning and has a
jor effect in the ﬁeld in which it occurs. Though the
in focus of the book is on economic events, the author
es that such events also occur in science, religion,
ture and politics.
The discovery of the Antarctic Ozone Hole in the mid-
0s was surely a black swan event in environmental
nces. It was undoubtedly a total surprise. Prior to its
overy the scientiﬁc consensus was that the effect of
ne Depleting Substances (ODS), such as chloroﬂuoro-
bons (CFC), would be ﬁrst seen near 40 km where the
ural variability of ozone is relatively small. Since the
ne amount near 40 km is small, the total ozone column
ve the surface was expected to change very little.
Globally averaged change in total column ozone was
expected to be only about 1%/decade. Given the large
natural variability of the total ozone, and the difﬁculty of
maintaining long-term calibration of instruments to such
high accuracy, such changes were not expected to be seen
in the data for a decade or longer. Changes in the total
column ozone over Antarctica turned out to be much larger
and occurred over much shorter time period. So, statisti-
cally the development of the Ozone Hole was a highly
improbable event.
Finally, the images of the Ozone Hole produced from
satellites captured the attention of public and media all
over the world, and led to scientiﬁc ﬁeld campaigns using
aircraft, balloon, and advanced ground-based instruments
deployed over Antarctica, coupled with new laboratory
measurements, to better understand the chemistry of the
stratospheric ozone layer. Though, plans to phase out the
ODSs had started before the discovery of the Ozone Hole,
and arguably the signing of the Montreal Protocol in
1987 was not directly inﬂuenced by it, there is no doubt
that the discovery of the Ozone Hole greatly inﬂuenced the
public and policy makers in accepting actions recommen-
ded by the signatories of the Montreal Protocol to phase
out the production of gases that provided broad societal
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A B S T R A C T
The author Nassim Taleb has coined the term ‘‘Black Swan’’ event to describe a very low
probability event that come as a surprise and has a major effect in the ﬁeld in which it
occurs. He suggests that such events have occurred in history, ﬁnance, science, and
technology more frequently than one can expect from stochastic theory. The discovery of
the Antarctic Ozone Hole ﬁts this description well. In this paper, we describe the events
surrounding this discovery and the role of NASA satellite data before and soon after the
seminal paper by Farman et al., in May 1985 that ﬁrst brought this phenomenon to the
attention of the broader science community.
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cal industry.
In his book, Dr. Taleb also discusses the chaos that
occurs when black swan events occur and how misinfor-
mation and theories are created post-hoc to explain what
did or did not occur. In this paper, we discuss such events
surrounding the discovery of the Antarctic Ozone Hole. A
previous version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings
of the Symposium for the 20th Anniversary of the Montreal
Protocol (Bhartia, 2009).
2. History of ozone measurement over Antarctica
Prior to the discovery of the ozone hole, the ozone layer
over Antarctica had been monitored from ground-based
and balloon-borne instruments for many decades, and by
satellites since 1970. A Dobson spectrophotometer at
NOAA’s South Pole Station had measured total ozone
column since 1961. The data from this station as well as
from other stations around the world had been archived at
the World Ozone and Ultraviolet Radiation Data Center
(WOUDC), Atmospheric Environmental Service, Downs-
view, Canada. WOUDC used to publish these data in the so-
called ‘‘Redbooks’’ that were distributed to institutions all
around the world. WOUDC also archives and distributes
ozonesonde data that provide ozone vertical proﬁle
information from the surface to about 30 km.
Routine measurement of Antarctic ozone from satellites
started in 1970 with the launch of the Backscatter UV
(BUV) instrument on NASA’s Numbus-4 satellite. Though,
in 1970, the depletion of the ozone layer was not an issue,
the instrument was fortuitously designed to measure
ozone density near 40 km as well as the total column ozone
above Earth’s surface (Mateer et al., 1971). Both these
measurements subsequently became important in under-
standing the effect of ODSs on the ozone layer. This
instrument had occasionally measured very low total
ozone values over Antarctica, lower than values measured
anywhere else in the world. However, at the time it was not
clear whether such values were caused by measurement
error or some real geophysical effect.
Though an instrument similar to BUV was ﬂown on the
Atmospheric Environment (AE) satellite in 1975, the
satellite orbit conﬁned the measurements to the tropics.
A major improvement in satellite ozone measuring
capability occurred with the launch of Nimbus-7 satellite
in October 1978. This satellite had an infrared limb
sounding instrument called LIMS to measure the ozone
proﬁle down to the tropopause but it lasted only about
7 months when the cryogen needed to cool the detectors
ran out. However, the satellite also had an instrument
package containing two nadir UV instruments called Solar
Backscatter UltraViolet (SBUV) and Total Ozone Mapping
Spectrometer (TOMS). The SBUV was an advanced version
of the BUV instrument with both total ozone and proﬁling
capability, while the TOMS was designed to be a global
total ozone mapping sensor with no proﬁling capability. In
1976 NASA formed an Ozone Processing Team (OPT) to
process the data from these instruments with a science
advisory team led by Donald Heath to oversee the
algorithm development efforts. Unfortunately, within a
year both UV instruments suffered degradation due to
contaminants deposited on the optical surfaces. An
international scientiﬁc panel formed by NASA to assess
the problem concluded that the degradation had made
these instruments unsuitable for monitoring the relatively
small changes in the ozone layer predicted by the models,
both at 40 km as well as in total ozone. A solution to
improve the total ozone record was found in circa 1983 and
was implemented. However, given slow computers and
the lack of digital data links to transport data, the data
processing was running nearly 9 months behind real time
though mid 1984. Therefore, the October 1983 data that
played a key role in the discovery of the Ozone Hole was
not processed until June 1984.
3. Discovery of the Ozone Hole
In May 1985, Farman et al. (1985) reported seeing a
large secular decrease in the total ozone column over the
Halley Bay station in Antarctica operated by the British
Antarctic Survey. It was the ﬁrst such paper published in a
widely circulated peer-reviewed scientiﬁc journal and the
ﬁrst to suggest an explanation of why the observed
decrease occurred only in September/October. They
postulated that this had something to do with the very
low temperatures that occur in the Antarctic polar vortex
in these months. Though it turns out that previously
Chubachi (1984, 1985) had reported seeing unusually low
ozone values in the lower stratosphere in the balloon data
taken at the Japanese Syowa station in Antarctica, these
results were reported in a conference and didn’t get much
notice at that time.
In August 1985, at the IAGA/IAMAP conference in
Prague, Czechoslovakia Bhartia et al. (1985) showed the
ﬁrst map of the Antarctic Ozone Hole produced by the
TOMS satellite instrument (Fig. 1). They also showed ozone
proﬁles and seasonal cycle of total ozone produced by the
companion SBUV instrument. These results conﬁrmed the
ﬁndings of Farman et al. (1985) and showed that the
decrease they had observed was a continent scale
phenomenon. Though this paper has not been published
many of the slides were reproduced by Callis and Natarajan
(1986) and some have appeared in other publications
(Fig. 2).
These results got lot of attention shortly thereafter in a
meeting in Salzburg, Austria in late August 1985 attended
by prominent scientists from around the world studying
the ozone layer (Fig. 3). The meeting had been organized in
1984 by Dr. Donald Heath, the Principal Investigator of the
SBUV instrument, to discuss state-of-the-art of ozone
science. Prof. Sherry Rowland who later received the
1995 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, along with Prof. Mario
Molina and Paul Crutzen, were also in attendance. Prof.
Rowland borrowed that ﬁrst Ozone Hole image from Dr.
Heath and released it to New York Times, where it was
published along with an article on November 7, 1985. Fol-
lowing that publication, many such images were published
in journals and magazines all across the world. These
iconic images still generate lot of attention in the public
and media some 3 decades after the phenomenon was ﬁrst
discovered.
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covery
As Nassim Taleb discusses in his book, the discovery of
 Ozone Hole also generated its share of chaos,
information, and missed opportunities. The ﬁrst such
sed opportunity occurred when Jonathan Shanklin,
uthor of Farman et al.’s (1985) paper, sent a letter to
ry Bloxom at NASA’s Wallops Island Center on October
 1983, reporting ‘‘low ozone values of around 200 Dob-
 Unit’’ at Halley Bay and wondered if it could be
nﬁrmed by satellite data’’. He also wondered if this was
ssibly connected with the El Chichon volcanic erup-
’’ that had occurred in April 1982. In a Nov 29,
3 reply to this letter Harvey Needleman, Head of the
loon Projects Branch at Wallops, indicates that the letter
s forward to Alfred Holland who at that time was
olved in ozone measurements at Wallops. Wallops had
n collecting ozone data from ground, balloons and
kets but was not directly involved with satellites. The
V & TOMS instruments were being managed at NASA
dard Space Flight Center (GSFC), Greenbelt, Maryland.
Though there is no record that A. Holland contacted
anyone at Goddard, as we have noted before, Spring
1983 satellite data were not processed at NASA GSFC until
June 1984. So, in the late 1983 no one at NASA had the
results to conﬁrm J. Shanklin’s results. Moreover, since
200 DU ozone values had been seen over Antarctica in the
satellite record going as far back as 1970, these low values
by themselves were not surprising. What was surprising is
the secular change in the Antarctic total ozone that was
reported by Farman et al. some 18 months later.
A second case of missed opportunity occurred when the
TOMS data processed in June 1984 revealed very low
values of ozone over Antarctica in Sept/Oct 1983. Though
initially it was thought that the problem was related to
instrument degradation or satellite malfunction, as the
satellite was well past its one year design lifetime, this was
quickly ruled out. The next step, as is typical in such cases
in satellite projects, was to ﬁnd ‘‘ground truth’’ data to
‘‘validate’’ satellite data. The aforementioned Red Book
from WOUDC provided such data from the South Pole
station. This station has been a trusted and reliable source
of data for satellite validation (Bhartia et al., 1984). To our
ig. 1. October 1, 1983 image of the Antarctic Ozone Hole shown by Bhartia et al. (1985) at the IAGA/IAMAP meeting in Prague, Czechoslovakia.
P.K. Bhartia, R.D. McPeters / C. R. Geoscience 350 (2018) 335–340338great disappointment, the values reported by the station
were about a factor of two larger than satellite values, and
moreover they were ‘‘normal’’ values where satellite data
appeared ‘‘abnormal’’. It turns out that the Dobson
measures were incorrect, presumably caused by operator
error, and were later retracted (Komhyr et al., 1986). Since
the data from Halley Bay station were not sent to WOUDC
and were not published in the Red Book, the next
opportunity to validate the satellite data came in October
1984 when the data from the South Pole station were
Fig. 2. Reproduction by the Journal of Chemical Education of another vugraph presented by Bhartia et al. (1985). It shows two images of Antarctic ozone taken
on the same day (October 3) but four years apart. Large decrease of total ozone over Antarctica with no discernable change in lower latitudes seen in these
images contradicted the model results predicting 1%/decade decrease in global total ozone due to CFCs. Comparison with Fig. 1 shows a rotating evolving
Ozone Hole that expanded in just 2 days to reach the tip of South America.
Fig. 3. Attendees to a scientiﬁc meeting held in Salzburg, Austria in August 1985 to discuss recent developments in ozone research. The meeting was
organized by Donald Health (foreground), the PI of NASA’s SBUV sensor and head of the SBUV/TOMS science team. Prof. Sherry Rowland (right top corner)
provided the copy of a vugraph presented at this meeting to New York Times where it was published on November 7, 1985.
dire
An 
upc
eve
the
Tho
issu
app
con
sch
ozo
pub
com
usu
the
hap
hou
lack
the
wh
5. L
sho
the
und
50 
der
The
bas
had
bas
Tec
Fig. 
valu
the 
P.K. Bhartia, R.D. McPeters / C. R. Geoscience 350 (2018) 335–340 339ctly sent to us. These data conﬁrmed satellite results.
abstract reporting the results was submitted to the
oming IAGA/IAMAP Symposium in December 1984.
Unfortunately, as is often the case with Black Swan
nts, there is wide body of misinformation ‘‘explaining’’
 cause of the ‘‘delay’’ in reporting NASA satellite data.
ugh in hindsight this is not a particularly important
e, we discuss it here since the misinformation has
eared in many scientiﬁc text books, and incorrect
clusions derived from this incident have appeared in
olarly articles. One such misinformation is that the low
ne values in satellite data were discovered after the
lication of Farman et al., 1985 paper. In fact, as is
mon in most NASA satellite projects, anomalies are
ally tracked by data system managers and reported to
 responsible science team quickly. This is exactly what
pened in this case. The problem was found within
rs and analyzed within days. However, as noted earlier,
 of validation data caused few month delay in reporting
 results. This too is a common practice at NASA in cases
en anomalous results are discovered in satellite data.
essons learned from this experience
We conclude this article by noting the key lessons that
uld have been derived from this experience, rather than
 misinformation that has been widely reported. To
erstand it we need to go back to a paper published
years ago (Dave & Mateer, 1967) where an algorithm to
ive total ozone from satellite data was ﬁrst proposed.
 circa 1984 algorithm used to process TOMS data was
ed on this algorithm. Prior to writing this paper Mateer
 developed an algorithm to process data from a ground-
ed ozone proﬁling technique called the ‘‘Umkehr
of radiances by remote sensing are inherently unstable
(Mateer, 1965). To make them stable one needs to
construct a priori proﬁles derived from data taken by in
situ instruments. The satellite total ozone algorithm
proposed by Dave & Mateer (1967) also used a priori
ozone proﬁles (called standard proﬁles), which they had
constructed using ozonesonde data at lower altitudes and
Umkehr data at higher altitudes, since no in situ data were
available at high altitudes at that time. Over the years,
these standard proﬁles have been improved as additional
ozonesonde data and satellite and sounding rocket became
available at higher altitudes starting in mid 70s. The circa
1984 SBUV and TOMS algorithms (Klenk et al., 1982) used
21 standard proﬁles. The total column ozone in these
proﬁles varied from 200 to 650 DU. Since any data far
outside this range could not be processed reliably they
were ﬂagged. This is what had caused large rejection of
data over Antarctica when September/October 1983 SBUV
and TOMS data were processed. The problem was
temporally solved by allowing the algorithm to derive
low ozone values using proﬁles created by linearly
extrapolating proﬁles containing 200 and 250 DU total
ozone. Though these proﬁles did not have the correct shape
in the lower stratosphere, as ozonesonde proﬁles obtained
later indicated, errors in TOMS total ozone maps published
in circa 1985 were not large, as comparison with later
maps produced using corrected ozone proﬁles show
(Fig. 4).
So, the key lessons to be learned from this experience is
the continuing need to collect high-quality data from in
situ instruments to generate a priori proﬁles for satellite
algorithms and validation data to conﬁrm satellite
ﬁndings. An appropriate metaphor is that satellites expand
the reach of in situ measurements as a surgeon using
4. The original Ozone Hole image for October 1, 1983 presented by Bhartia et al. (1985) compared to a recent image for the same date. Though the
es rendered in the original image were not accurate since correct ozone proﬁles were not available at that time to process the data, the basic patterns in
two images are similar.otic instruments does for patients in remote areas.hnique’’. He had found that algorithms for the inversion rob
P.K. Bhartia, R.D. McPeters / C. R. Geoscience 350 (2018) 335–340340However, as the robotic instruments cannot replace the
surgeon, satellite instruments often do not replace the
capabilities of in situ instruments.
For further discussion of the events described in this
article the readers are referred to a recent posting by Dr.
Gavin Schmidt at http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/
archives/2017/12/
what-did-nasa-know-and-when-did-they-know-it/.
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